Throwing Away the Key: Has the Adam Walsh Act Lowered the Threshold for Sexually Violent Predator Commitments Too Far? by Lave, Tamara Rice
  
391 
THROWING AWAY THE KEY:  HAS THE ADAM WALSH ACT 
LOWERED THE THRESHOLD FOR SEXUALLY VIOLENT 
PREDATOR COMMITMENTS TOO FAR? 
Tamara Rice Lave * 
Public outrage spurred passage of the first sexually violent preda-
tor law.  Citizens in the state of Washington were horrified by a rash 
of high profile crimes by convicted sex offenders who had been re-
leased from prison.1  After a particularly horrific attack by a mentally 
impaired parolee with a history of kidnapping, rape, and murder, 
thousands of letters flooded the governor’s office demanding that 
something be done.  In February 1990, Washington responded to the 
mounting pressure by passing the Community Protection Act, which 
authorizes the indefinite commitment of individuals determined to 
be sexual violent predators (“SVPs”) after they have completed their 
maximum prison term.2  In order to commit someone under Wash-
ington’s law, the state must prove that the accused (1) has at least one 
prior crime of sexual violence and (2) currently suffers from a mental 
abnormality or personality disorder that (3) makes him likely to en-
gage in future predatory acts of sexual violence.3  Nineteen states and 
the federal government have since followed Washington’s lead.4 
These laws are motivated by a worthy goal—protecting innocent 
men, women, and children from menacing sex offenders.  At the 
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 1 Barry Siegel, Locking Up ‘Sexual Predators’:  A Public Outcry in Washington State Targeted Re-
peat Violent Sex Criminals.  A New Preventative Law Would Keep Them in Jail Indefinitely, L.A. 
TIMES, May 10, 1990, at A1. 
 2 Michael G. Petrunik, Managing Unacceptable Risk:  Sex Offenders, Community Response, and 
Social Policy in the United States and Canada, 46 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP.  
CRIMINOLOGY 483, 492 (2002) (comparing the risk management model for control of sex 
offenders with the clinical and justice models that preceded it, and with a restorative jus-
tice alternative based on the principle of community reintegration). 
 3 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020 (West 2008). 
 4 See infra Part IV.A. 
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same time, however, these laws pose a significant danger—locking 
away individuals for the rest of their lives who would not commit a sex 
offense if released.  With stakes this high, accused SVPs should re-
ceive the highest procedural protections, yet the Supreme Court has 
ruled that they are not entitled to many of the due process rights 
guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.5  As a result, they do not enjoy the right to competency, the 
right against self-incrimination, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or 
trial by jury.6 
In United States v. Comstock,7 the Supreme Court upheld the Adam 
Walsh Child Safety and Protection Act (“Adam Walsh Act”),8 which 
reduces these protections still further.  The Adam Walsh Act allows a 
person to be committed indefinitely as a sexually violent predator9 
even if the person has never been convicted of, or even been charged 
with, a sex crime.  This means that any person who is in federal cus-
tody faces lifetime commitment as a dangerous sex offender if the 
government is able to persuade a judge by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the person has committed, or attempted to commit, a 
sexually violent offense or child molestation even though the person 
was not locked up for such an offense and a jury did not find the per-
son had committed such a crime.10  Clear and convincing evidence is 
a lesser standard than beyond a reasonable doubt, and a judge and 
not a jury makes the requisite factual determination.  Accordingly, 
under the Adam Walsh Act, a person can be confined for life even 
though the evidence would not have supported a jury verdict of guilt. 
 
 5 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356–60 (1997) (upholding a Kansas civil confinement 
statute that required past sexually violent behavior and a mental condition that creates a 
likelihood of such conduct in the future as prerequisites for incapacitation under the sta-
tute). 
 6 See infra notes 116–78 and accompanying text. 
 7 United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1954 (2010) (holding that the Constitution 
grants Congress the authority to enact § 4248 as “necessary and proper for carrying into 
Execution” the powers “vested by” the “Constitution in the Government of the United 
States” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18)). 
 8 18 U.S.C. §§ 4247, 4248(a) (2006).  The Adam Walsh Act was passed by both houses of 
Congress and signed by the President in 2006.  Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety 
Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901–16991 (2006)). 
 9 The Adam Walsh Act uses the term “sexually dangerous persons.”  Adam Walsh Child 
Protection and Safety Act of 2006, § 301(a).  In the interests of consistency (and since 
they are defined almost identically), this Article will refer to those committed as sexually 
violent predators. 
 10 18 U.S.C. § 4248(d) (2006) (stating that “[i]f after the hearing, the court finds by clear 
and convincing evidence that the person is a sexually dangerous person, the court shall 
commit the person to the custody of the Attorney General”). 
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Although the Court ruled that the Adam Walsh Act was constitu-
tional, it did so on narrow grounds.  It held only that Congress had 
not exceeded its power under the Necessary and Proper Cause11:  “We 
do not reach or decide any claim that the statute or its application 
denies equal protection of the laws, procedural or substantive due 
process, or any other rights guaranteed by the Constitution.”12  This 
Article considers a question that the Supreme Court specifically left 
open in Comstock:  Does the Adam Walsh Act violate procedural due 
process? 
To grapple with this question, this Article first asks whether per-
sons subject to sexually violent predator laws deserve procedural pro-
tections.  Some believe that because all, or at least most, sex offenders 
will reoffend, it is just a waste of time and money to accord them or-
dinary due process rights.  This Article shows that contrary to wide-
spread belief, the rate of sex offender recidivism is actually quite 
small.  The danger of a substantial number of unnecessary lifetime 
incarcerations makes it particularly important to have a sufficiently 
robust due process regime in place. 
Part II contrasts the due process rights of sexually violent preda-
tors with those of other individuals whose mental state is at issue:  the 
criminally insane and the mentally ill.  The Article shows that for the 
most part, accused sexually violent predators have fewer procedural 
protections than these other similarly situated individuals. 
Part III discusses the justifications in the three seminal Supreme 
Court cases for diminishing the due process protections of accused 
sexually violent predators:  Kansas v. Hendricks,13 Kansas v. Crane,14 and 
United States v. Comstock.15 
Part IV then turns to state law regarding sexually violent preda-
tors, focusing on the procedural protections guaranteed by the state 
SVP laws.  It then compares these state law protections with the con-
stitutional minima provided by the U.S. Supreme Court.  This data, 
presented for the first time, provides a road map to SVP legislation 
that should prove of practical importance to judges and practitioners.  
Given the public’s fear of sex offenders and politicians’ interest in 
appearing tough on crime, one might suspect that states would have 
 
 11 Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1965. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357 (1997). 
 14 Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 411–15 (2002) (vacating a Kansas Supreme Court judg-
ment that interpreted Kansas v. Hendricks so that the state was required to prove that the 
dangerous individual was completely unable to control his behavior to warrant confine-
ment—a standard determined by the Court in Crane to be too high). 
 15 See Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949. 
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conferred only the minimum protections, but this Article shows that 
most states have granted more. 
Part V discusses whether the Supreme Court should allow a per-
son to be committed indefinitely as a sexually violent predator even 
though he has never been convicted of, or even charged with, a sex 
offense.  This Article argues that in creating such a low threshold for 
commitment, the Adam Walsh Act violates procedural due process. 
Finally, Part VI contends that enhanced procedural protections 
make sense from a public policy perspective.  Thus, this Article con-
cludes by arguing that states should not follow the Adam Walsh Act 
regardless of how the Court rules. 
I.  DO SEX OFFENDERS DESERVE PROCEDURAL PROTECTION? 
The fundamental factual question that needs to be answered for a 
person to be committed under an SVP statute is whether he has a 
current mental disorder that causes him to have difficulty controlling 
himself such that he is at risk of committing a new sexually violent of-
fense.  The diminished due process standards afforded to accused 
SVPs during this process appear to derive from the belief of politi-
cians and the general public that most, if not all, sex offenders will 
continue to be dangerous even after they have served their prison 
sentences.16  Many believe that child molesters pose the gravest dan-
ger because, as Justice Breyer wrote, they suffer from “pedophilia—a 
mental abnormality that critically involves what a lay person might 
describe as a lack of control.”17 
If politicians and the public are correct then procedural protec-
tions for accused sexually violent predators may seem less critical.  If 
everyone is going to reoffend, then the only kind of mistake we could 
ever make is a false negative—releasing someone who we think is safe 
but is actually still dangerous.  Indeed, if a significant share, but not 
all, people are likely to reoffend then there is an argument for lesser 
due process because the expected societal cost of a false negative 
 
 16 Between April 19, 2005, and May 1, 2005, a poll sponsored by CNN/USA Today and Gal-
lup asked respondents:  “At your best guess, do you think people who commit the crime 
of child sexual molestation can be successfully rehabilitated to the point where they are 
no longer a threat to children, or not?”  Twenty-seven percent of those who responded 
said that child molesters could be rehabilitated, whereas 65% said they could not.  Tama-
ra Rice Lave, Inevitable Recidivism—The Origin and Centrality of an Urban Legend, 34 INT’L 
J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 186, 188 (2011) (examining the conviction that sex offenders—
particularly child molesters—will continue to reoffend). 
 17 Crane, 534 U.S. at 414. 
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outweighs the expected cost of a false positive.18  Contrary to public 
opinion, however, studies show that most offenders do not continue 
to recidivate after being released.19  This means that society must con-
front the very real problem of the false positive—locking someone 
away who would not otherwise reoffend.20 
In 2003, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) released a report 
studying the recidivism of sex offenders released in 1994.21  The DOJ 
study followed the entire population of sex offenders released from 
 
 18 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (holding that courts should apply a 
three-part balancing test in determining whether an individual’s due process rights have 
been violated under the U.S. Constitution, namely (1) the significance of the interest at 
stake, (2) the risk of a false deprivation of the interest due to the procedures used as well 
as an assessment of the probable value of additional procedural safeguards, and (3) the 
government’s interest). 
 19 These studies have been criticized for not taking into account underreporting.  See Jody 
Clay-Warner & Callie H. Burt, Rape Reporting After Reforms:  Have Times Really Changed?, 11 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 150, 150–51 (2005) (stating that despite the significance of 
reporting to the overall success of reforms, only limited empirical research has examined 
changes in rape reporting across time); Bonnie S. Fisher, Leah E. Daigle, Francis T. Cul-
len & Michael G. Turner, Reporting Sexual Victimization to the Police and Others:  Results From 
a National-Level Study of College Women, 30 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 6, 7 (2003) (discussing 
empirical data from various studies concluding that a large proportion of victims did not 
report their sexual victimization to the police or other authorities); Mary P. Koss, Chris-
tine A. Gidycz & Nadine Wisniewski, The Scope of Rape:  Incidence and Prevalence of Sexual 
Aggression and Victimization in a National Sample of Higher Education Students, 55 J. 
CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 162, 162 (1987) (estimating that for every rape re-
ported, three to ten rapes are committed but not reported); John J. Sloan III, Bonnie S. 
Fisher & Francis T. Cullen, Assessing the Student Right to Know and Campus Security Act of 
1990:  An Analysis of the Victim Reporting Practices of College and University Students, 43 CRIME 
& DELINQUENCY 148, 149 (1997) (stating that the usefulness of measuring the incidence 
and nature of campus crime may be limited because the Student Right to Know and 
Campus Security Act’s reporting requirements overlook theft-related crimes and depend 
on victim reporting).  The National Crime Victimization Survey (“NCVS”)—which esti-
mates crime victimization across the United States using a nationally representative sam-
ple of households—finds significantly higher reporting rates.  MICHAEL RAND & SHANNAN 
CATALANO, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PUB. NO. NCJ 219413, 
CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2006, at 5 (2007).  The Bureau of Justice Statistics estimated 
that 41.4% of all forcible rapes and sexual assaults were reported to the police in 2006.  
Id.  Reporting rates were similar for the three-year period studied in the 2003 Department 
of Justice report.  For a detailed discussion of underreporting in sex crimes, see Tamara 
Rice Lave, Controlling Sexually Violent Predators:  Continued Incarceration at What Cost?  14 
NEW CRIM. L. REV. 213 (2011). 
 20 See Lave, supra note 19, at 266 (stating that despite the fact that the general public be-
lieves that sex offenders are incapable of controlling themselves, recidivism rates in the 
United States, according to studies by the Department of Justice, are actually low). 
 21 PATRICK A. LANGAN, ERICA L. SCHMITT & MATTHEW R. DUROSE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PUB. NO. NCJ 198281, RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS 
RELEASED FROM PRISON IN 1994 (2003) [hereinafter DOJ]. 
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prison in fifteen states—9691 sex offenders.22  Of these offenders, 
3115 had been convicted of rape; 6576 were convicted of sexual as-
sault; 4295 were convicted of child molestation; and 443 were con-
victed of statutory rape for a total of 9691 out of 272,111 prisoners re-
leased in 1994.23  Within three years after release from prison, 5.3% 
or 517 of the convicted sex offenders were rearrested for a new sex 
crime.24  During that same three-year period, 5.0% of convicted rap-
ists were rearrested for a new sex crime.25  Finally, 3.3% or 141 of the 
convicted child molesters were arrested for another sex crime against 
a child.26 
It is important to note that researchers continued to track re-
leased offenders during the entire three-year period.27  If, for in-
stance, a person were rearrested for burglary and then later for rape 
both of these arrests would have been recorded.  Thus within the en-
tire three-year period, just 5.3% of sex offenders were rearrested for a 
new sex crime.28 
It is true, however, that convicted sex offenders were significantly 
more likely to be arrested for a new sex crime than released offenders 
who had not been convicted of a sex crime.  Compared to 5.3% of 
convicted sex offenders, only 1.3% of persons convicted for non-sex 
related offenses were subsequently arrested for a sex crime within 
three years after release.29  Less than half of 1% of those previously 
convicted of a non-sex offense were rearrested for a new sex crime 
against a child.30 
Not only do few sex offenders get rearrested for committing a new 
sex crime, but sex offenders are less likely then non-sex offenders to 
 
 22 These states were Arizona, Maryland, North Carolina, California, Michigan, Ohio, Dela-
ware, Minnesota, Oregon, Florida, New Jersey, Texas, Illinois, New York, and Virginia.  Id. 
at 1. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. at 24. 
 26 Id. at 1. 
 27 All available studies show that recidivism rates drop each year after an offender’s release: 
For all crimes (and almost all behaviours) the likelihood that the behavior will 
reappear decreases the longer the person has abstained from that behaviour.  The 
recidivism rate within the first two years after release from prison is much higher 
than the recidivism rate between years 10 and 12 after release from prison. 
  ANDREW J.R. HARRIS & R. KARL HANSON, SEX OFFENDER RECIDIVISM:  A SIMPLE QUESTION, 
PUBLIC SAFETY & EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS CANADA 1 (2004).  Harris and Hanson found 
that the rate of recidivism in the populations they studied decreased by half every five 
years.  Id. at 9. 
 28 Id. at 11. 
 29 DOJ, supra note 21, at 24. 
 30 Id. at 30. 
Dec. 2011] THROWING AWAY THE KEY 397 
 
be rearrested for any crime at all.  Forty-three percent of sex offend-
ers released in 1994 were arrested for a new crime within three 
years.31  In contrast, 68% of non-sex offenders released in 1994 were 
arrested for any new crime within three years.32 
Other studies have come to similar conclusions.  In 1998, Hanson 
and Bussiere did a meta-analysis of sixty-one studies from six different 
countries, including the United States.33  They found that over an av-
erage follow-up time of four to five years, the sex offense recidivism 
rate was 13.4%.34  In 2007, Sample and Bray used arrest data from 
1990–1997 collected by the Illinois State Police.35  They found that 
less than 4% of convicted child molesters were rearrested for any sex 
offense within one, three, and five years after release from custody.36  
They also found that about 7% of convicted rapists were rearrested 
for any sex offense within five years after release.  37 
Not only do most sex offenders not recidivate, but, like other 
types of offenders, their risk of doing so decreases as they age.  In 
2002, R. Karl Hanson used data from ten follow up studies of adult 
male sex offenders ages 18–70+ (combined sample of 4673) to study 
the relationship between age and sexual recidivism.  He found that 
“[i]n the total sample, the recidivism rate declined steadily with 
age . . . . [and] [t]he association was linear.”38  Other researchers have 
reported similar results,39 even when analyzing the age effect on a 
 
 31 Id. at 2. 
 32 Id. 
 33 R. Karl Hanson & Monique T. Bussière, Predicting Relapse:  A Meta-Analysis of Sexual Offend-
er Recidivism Studies, 66 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 348, 350 (1998). 
 34 Id. at 357. 
 35 Lisa L. Sample & Timothy M. Bray, Are Sex Offenders Different?  An Examination of Rearrest 
Patterns, 17 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 83, 88 (2006). 
 36 Id. at 95. 
 37 Id. 
 38 R. Karl Hanson, Recidivism and Age:  Follow-Up Data from 4,673 Sexual Offenders, 17 J. 
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1046, 1053 (2002).  Interestingly, Hanson found that there 
were differences among offender groups.  Id. at 1054.  The recidivism rate of both incest 
offenders and rapists declined steadily over time, and neither type of offender released 
after age sixty recidivated.  Id.  Although the recidivism rate of extra-familial child mole-
sters also declined steadily with age, the drop was much less until the offender reached 
age forty-nine, when recidivism dropped dramatically.  Id.  Two extrafamilial child mole-
sters released after the age of sixty recidivated.  Id.  
 39 Howard E. Barbaree et al., Aging Versus Stable Enduring Traits as Explanatory Constructs in 
Sex Offender Recidivism:  Partitioning Actuarial Prediction into Conceptually Meaningful Compo-
nents, 36 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 443, 443 (2009) (“A large body of evidence has recently ac-
cumulated indicating that recidivism in sex offenders decreases with the age of the of-
fender at the time of his release from custody.” (citations omitted)); Patrick Lussier et al., 
Criminal Trajectories of Adult Sex Offenders and the Age Effect:  Examining the Dynamic Aspect of 
Offending in Adulthood, 20 INT’L CRIM. JUST. REV. 147, 164 (2010) (showing that “there 
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sample of offenders with a higher recidivism rate than the general 
prison population.40 
The significance of the protective value of age in recidivating can-
not be underestimated in the sexually violent predator context.  
Since accused SVPs must have completed their custodial sentence be-
fore the state can begin commitment proceedings, they are likely to 
be older and thus at lower risk of reoffending.  As a result, states and 
the federal government may be initiating civil commitment proceed-
ings against individuals who have simply aged out of being danger-
ous. 
The facts are crystal clear.  The DOJ study and other studies show 
that sex offenders have a low rate of recidivism and that they are less 
likely than non-sex offenders to commit additional non-sex related 
crimes.  In addition, because accused sexually violent predators are 
older, their risk of reoffending has diminished.  Accordingly, it is 
crucial to provide extensive procedural protections so as to prevent 
people from being locked up indefinitely—most of whom in fact pose 
no further threat to society.  As the next Part shows, however, accused 
sexually violent predators enjoy reduced procedural rights. 
 
 
might be several explanations as to why older sex offenders represent a lower risk of reci-
divism”); Patrick Lussier & Jay Healey, Rediscovering Quetelet, Again:  The “Aging” Offender 
and the Prediction of Reoffending in a Sample of Adult Sex Offenders, 26 JUST. Q. 827, 851 
(2009) (finding that the risk of recidivism does decrease with age); Richard Wollert et al., 
Recent Research (N = 9,305) Underscores the Importance of Using Age-Stratified Actuarial Tables in 
Sex Offender Risk Assessments, 22 SEXUAL ABUSE:  J. OF RES. & TREATMENT 471, 484 (2010) 
(concluding that “evaluators should report recidivism estimates from age stratified tables 
or equivalent tables when they are assessing sexual recidivism risk, particularly when eva-
luating the aging sex offender”). 
 40 In 2007, Prentky and Lee looked at the age effect on a cohort of 136 rapists and 115 child 
molesters who had been civilly committed to a Massachusetts prison and were then fol-
lowed for twenty-five years.  Robert Alan Prentky & Austin F. S. Lee, Effect of Age-at-Release 
on Long Term Sexual Re-offense Rates in Civilly Committed Sexual Offenders, 19 SEXUAL ABUSE:  
J. OF RES. & TREATMENT, 43, 53 (2007).  They found that with rapists, recidivism dropped 
linearly as a function of age.  Id.  With child molesters, however, they found that recidiv-
ism increased from age twenty to age forty and then declined slightly at age fifty and sig-
nificantly at age sixty.  Id.  As Prentky and Lee point out, their sample is statistically small 
and it is comprised of offenders with a higher base rate of recidivism than drawn from the 
general prison population.  They conclude: 
Although this latter consideration must be regarded as a limitation in terms of ge-
neralizability, it may also be seen as a strength of the study.  Presumably, using a 
higher risk sample is a more severe test of the age-crime hypothesis, providing 
confirmatory support for the rapists and “amplifying” or exaggerating the quadrat-
ic blip in Hanson’s (2002) data for child molesters. 
  Id. at 58. 
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II. COMPARING THE DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OF ACCUSED SVPS TO 
SIMILARLY SITUATED INDIVIDUALS 
The sexually violent predator laws have four distinctive features.  
First, they are classified as civil,41 which has broad implications for the 
rights that those facing commitment as SVP’s enjoy.  Second, com-
mitment is almost always indeterminate; thus, a person remains a 
sexually violent predator unless and until he is deemed to no longer 
pose a threat.42  Third, SVP commitment occurs at the back end of a 
penal commitment.43  In other words, the state does not begin the 
process of designating someone a sexually violent predator until he is 
about to be released from custody.  Fourth and finally, commitment 
is a supplement, not an alternative, to a prison sentence.44  This Part 
compares the procedural rights of sexually violent predators with 
other individuals whose mental state is at issue:  the criminally insane 
and the mentally ill.  Despite the fact that accused sexually violent 
predators face greater, or at least equal, deprivations of liberty, they 
are afforded fewer procedural protections. 
1.  Comparing Sexually Violent Predator Laws with Commitment of the 
Criminally Insane 
The factual question at a criminal insanity hearing is whether the 
defendant was legally insane at the time that he committed his crimes 
as compared with sexually violent predator hearings in which the 
question is whether the individual has a currently diagnosed mental 
disorder that causes him to be dangerous.  Because a criminal insani-
ty hearing takes place within the context of the criminal adjudicatory 
process, these defendants have more procedural protections than 
SVPs. 
One notable difference between an insanity hearing and an SVP 
hearing is the right to competency.  All criminal defendants have the 
right to be competent,45 and since a criminal defendant must enter a 
 
 41 See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 368–69 (1997) (stating that involuntary confine-
ment pursuant to Kansas’ Sexually Violent Predator Act is not punitive). 
 42 Id. at 363–64 (“If, at any time, the confined person is adjudged ‘safe to be at large,’ he is 
statutorily entitled to immediate release.” (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07 (1994))). 
 43 Id. at 352–53. 
 44 Id. at 352–54 (stating that an individual determined to be a sexually violent predator 
would be “transferred to the custody of the Secretary of Social and Rehabiliation Servic-
es . . . for ‘control, care and treatment until such time as the person’s mental abnormality 
or personality disorder has so changed that the person is safe to be at large’”). 
 45 See Bishop v. United States, 350 U.S. 961, 961 (1956) (per curiam) (vacating judgment 
and remanding the case to the district court for a hearing on the sanity of petitioner at 
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plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, he must be deemed compe-
tent in order to enter that plea.46  In contrast, since sexually violent 
predator commitments are civil, there is no constitutional right to 
competency.47 
Competency means that a defendant must understand the charges 
against him and be able to assist in his own defense.  If it appears at 
any time after the commencement of prosecution and prior to 
sentencing that a defendant does not meet this threshold, then the 
court must suspend criminal proceedings and conduct a hearing 
either in front of a jury or on its own.  At that hearing, the state is 
permitted to presume competency and require the defendant to 
prove otherwise by a preponderance of the evidence.48  Should a 
judge or jury find that a defendant is not competent to stand trial, he 
may not be held more than the “reasonable period of time necessary 
to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will 
attain that capacity in the foreseeable future.”49  If it is determined 
that competency is not foreseeable, the state must either begin the 
standard civil commitment procedures or release him.50 
The criminally insane also have the right to have jurors determine 
whether they were insane at the time they committed their offense,51 
as well as the right against self-incrimination at that trial.  States may 
 
the time of his trial); see also Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 386 (1966) (holding that 
“Robinson’s constitutional rights were abridged by his failure to receive an adequate 
hearing on his competence to stand trial”). 
 46 See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 449 (1992) (“[T]he entry of a plea of not guilty by 
reason of insanity . . . presupposes that the defendant is competent to stand trial and to 
enter a plea.”). 
 47 See Moore v. Super. Ct., 237 P.3d 530, 547 (Cal. 2010) (holding that “due process does 
not require mental competence on the part of someone undergoing a commitment or 
recommitment trial under the SVPA”). 
 48 See Medina, 505 U.S. at 452–53 (stating that there is a presumption of competence on the 
defendant, that the defendant bears the burden of rebutting it, and that the presumption 
does not violate the Due Process Clause).  But see Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 369 
(1996) (holding that it was unconstitutional to require the defendant to prove compe-
tency by clear and convincing evidence). 
 49  Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). 
 50 See id. (holding that the state must either institute customary civil commitment proceed-
ings or release the defendant if it cannot be determined that there is a substantial proba-
bility that he will attain capacity in the foreseeable future). 
 51 In Ford v. Wainright, the Supreme Court ruled that executing the insane violates the 
Eighth Amendment.  477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986).  Although condemned inmates have the 
right to a full and fair hearing on whether they are insane, the Court has never held that 
they have the right to a jury finding on that fact.  Id. at 424–25 (Powell, J., concurring); see 
also Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398, 409 (1897) (holding that a suggestion made after 
verdict and sentence that the defendant might be insane does not give rise to an absolute 
right to have the insanity issue tried before a jury). 
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afford SVPs these rights, but they are not required to do so under the 
Constitution.52 
Although the criminally insane enjoy more procedural protec-
tions than SVPs, one notable exception regards the burden of proof.  
As discussed above, SVP hearings almost always occur after a person 
has been convicted of a crime and after he has completed his penal 
sentence.  The burden of proof is on the prosecutor, and she must 
show by at least clear and convincing evidence that the individual has 
a current mental disorder that causes him to have difficulty control-
ling himself such that he poses the risk of future dangerousness. 
In contrast, insanity is usually an affirmative defense at trial.  Al-
though the Supreme Court has never held that defendants have the 
right to the insanity defense,53 most states allow it.54  The Supreme 
Court has ruled that it does not violate due process for the defendant 
to have to prove his insanity beyond a reasonable doubt.55  Most states 
set the burden of proof at a preponderance of the evidence, and only 
Arizona requires that the defendant prove that he was insane by clear 
and convincing evidence.56 
Commitment for both is indefinite.  If a person is found not guilty 
by reason of insanity, he can be committed to a locked mental hos-
pital until he can show that he is either no longer mentally ill or dan-
gerous.57  The Supreme Court has held that he may be committed for 
a period that exceeds the maximum sentence associated with the un-
derlying charges.58  Similarly, a person adjudicated to be an SVP can 
be held until he is determined to no longer have a currently diag-
nosed mental disorder that causes him to be dangerous. 
 
 52 See Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 375 (1986) (holding that commitment proceedings un-
der Illinois’s Sexually Dangerous Persons Act were civil and not criminal and thus the 
right against self incrimination did not apply). 
 53 Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 752 n.20 (2006). 
 54 See Elizabeth Aileen Smith, Did They Forget to Zero the Scales?:  To Ease Jury Deliberations, the 
Supreme Court Cuts Protection for the Mentally Ill in Clark v. Arizona, 26 L. & INEQUALITY J. 
203, 209 (2008) (stating that four states have eliminated the insanity defense altogether). 
 55 Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 799 (1952). 
 56 Four states do not allow the insanity defense.  Smith, supra note 54, at 209. 
 57 See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361 (1983) (“Congress has determined that a 
criminal defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity in the District of Columbia 
should be committed indefinitely to a mental institution for treatment and the protection 
of society.”). 
 58 Id. at 369–70. 
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2.  Comparing Sexually Violent Predator Laws with Commitment of the 
Mentally Ill 
The sexually violent predator laws were specifically enacted to allow 
the state to commit repeat sex offenders who did not fall under the 
existing civil commitment laws because they were not mentally ill.59  
When Washington crafted the first SVP law, it created a new standard 
of mental defect—that of a “mental abnormality or personality dis-
order which makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts of 
sexual violence . . . .”60  Other states would soon follow Washington’s 
lead, including Kansas, whose sexually violent predator statute was 
upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in Kansas v. Hendricks.61 
Both the National Mental Health Association and the Washington 
State Psychiatric Association were deeply concerned by this newly de-
fined quasi-mental illness, and they wrote amicus briefs in Hendricks 
urging the Court to overturn the Kansas statute on the grounds that 
it would confine individuals who were not mentally ill.  The Washing-
ton State Psychiatric Association pointed out the dangers of using 
such an ambiguous term:  “Because ‘mental abnormality’ has no rec-
ognized clinical meaning, there is no way to assure it will be applied 
so that only persons who are mentally ill are subject to civil commit-
ment.”62  As noted below, however, the Supreme Court held that 
committing someone with a “mental abnormality” does not violate 
the person’s due process rights.63 
Although the sexually violent predator laws have a more expansive 
definition of mental illness than the laws governing civil commitment 
of the mentally ill, they offer similar procedural protections.  Both 
have the right to written notice and an adversary hearing before an 
independent decisionmaker.64  At that hearing, they have the right to 
“qualified and independent assistance.”65  In addition, both require 
that the state prove by a minimum standard of clear and convincing 
evidence that the person being committed is both mentally ill and 
dangerous.66  In meeting this burden, the state must show that the 
 
 59 See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 351 (1997) (“[T]he legislature determined that 
existing civil commitment procedures were inadequate to confront the risks presented by 
‘sexually violent predators.’”). 
 60 WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020 (18) (2008). 
 61 Id. at 371. 
 62 Brief for Washington State Pyschiatric Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respon-
dent, Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (No. 95-1649), 1996 WL 468611 at *14. 
 63 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 360. 
 64 Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980). 
 65 Id. at 500. 
 66 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979). 
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person’s mental illness causes the person to be dangerous.67  In Kan-
sas v. Crane,68 the Supreme Court held that in order to commit some-
one as a sexually violent predator, the state must show that the per-
son’s “mental abnormality” or “personality disorder” makes it “diffi-
“difficult, if not impossible for the [dangerous] person to control his 
dangerous behavior.”69  With regards to civil commitments of the 
mentally ill, the states have differed as to what must be shown in or-
der to prove dangerousness.  Some states, like Virginia, Georgia, 
Montana, Hawaii, and Ohio require that the state prove that the indi-
vidual poses an “imminent danger” to himself or others.70  Most 
states, however, use a lesser standard, that of:  “substantial likelihood” 
or “significant risk.”71 
Once the state has proved that a person is mentally ill and dan-
gerous or a sexually violent predator, he can be committed indefi-
nitely.  Once that person is determined to no longer be mentally ill 
or dangerous or to have a diagnosed mental disorder, he must be re-
leased.72 
III.  CHALLENGES TO THE SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR LAWS 
The previous Part showed that a person in an SVP proceeding en-
joys less procedural protection than persons facing commitment for 
being criminally insane or mentally ill.  This Part explores the Su-
preme Court’s justifications for affording less protection in the con-
text of sexually violent predator commitments. 
A.  Kansas v. Hendricks 
The first challenge to the sexually violent predator laws reached 
the Supreme Court in Kansas v. Hendricks.73  Leroy Hendricks was an 
admitted pedophile whose record of child molestation convictions 
 
 67 Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 73 (1992). 
 68 534 U.S. 407 (2002). 
 69 Id. at 410 (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997)). 
 70 Alison Pfeffer, Note, “Imminent Danger” and Inconsistency:  The Need for National Reform of the 
“Imminent Danger” Standard for Involuntary Civil Commitment in the Wake of the Virginia Tech 
Tragedy, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 277, 279 (2008). 
 71 Id. 
 72 See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 83 (holding that the state cannot continue to civilly commit some-
one who may be dangerous but is not mentally ill); O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 
576 (1975) (holding that the state cannot continue to civilly commit someone who is 
mentally ill but not dangerous). 
 73 521 U.S. 346 (1997). 
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stretched out over twenty-nine years.74  In 1994, a Kansas jury found 
that Leroy Hendricks was a sexually violent predator—meaning that 
he had a “mental abnormality” or “personality disorder” that made it 
likely that he would engage in “predatory acts of sexual violence.75  As 
a result of this finding, Hendricks was committed indefinitely to a 
locked facility.76 
Hendricks appealed the finding to the Kansas Supreme Court, ar-
guing that the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act violated the U.S. 
Constitution’s “substantive” Due Process, Double Jeopardy, and Ex 
Post Facto Clauses.77  The Kansas Supreme Court addressed only 
Hendricks’ due process claim and overturned the conviction on the 
ground that “mental abnormality” as defined by the Act did not meet 
the standards for mental illness as set out by the U.S. Supreme Court 
in cases governing civil commitment.78  The state of Kansas appealed 
to the U.S. Supreme Court, which narrowly overturned the Kansas 
Supreme Court.  Justice Thomas wrote the majority opinion. 
The majority began its analysis by noting that in narrow circums-
tances “an individual’s constitutionally protected liberty interest in 
avoiding physical restraint may be overridden even in the civil con-
text.”79  Specifically, society may restrain dangerous individuals who 
cannot control themselves in the name of public safety.80  A finding of 
future dangerousness, alone, would be insufficient to justify involun-
tary commitment.  Civil commitment statutes have been sustained, 
“when they have coupled proof of dangerousness with the proof of 
some additional factor, such as a ‘mental illness’ or ‘mental abnor-
mality.’”81  In addition, the statutes must also meet “proper proce-
dur(al) and evidentiary standards.”82 
The Court held that the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act did 
meet these standards.  In his majority opinion, Justice Thomas em-
phasized the fact that in order to be committed, a person must have 
either (1) been charged with a sexually violent offense but found in-
competent to stand trial, or (2) been convicted of a sexually violent 
offense, or (3) been found not guilty by reason of insanity, or due to 
a mental disease or defect, of a sexually violent offense.  The statute 
 
 74 Id. at 353–56. 
 75 Id. at 352, 356. 
 76 Id. at 350. 
 77 Id. at 356. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. at 357. 
 81 Id. at 358. 
 82 Id. at 357. 
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requires proof of more than a mere predisposition to violence; rather 
“[i]t requires evidence of past sexually violent behavior and a present 
mental condition that creates a likelihood of such conduct in the fu-
ture if the person is not incapacitated.”83 
The Court further held that the Act passed constitutional muster 
even though it used the term “mental abnormality” instead of mental 
illness.  In so doing, the Court ignored the amicus briefs written by 
the National Mental Health Association and the Washington State 
Psychiatric Association in which they urged the Court to overturn the 
Kansas statute on the grounds that it would confine individuals who 
were not mentally ill.  The National Mental Health Association wrote, 
“The term ‘mental illness’ is reserved for psychological conditions 
that impair virtually every aspect of the lives of people it affects.  It 
does not apply to those who merely cannot resist deviant sexual urges 
whose origin, in any case, is unrelated to mental illness.”84 
The Washington State Psychiatric Association made a similar ar-
gument.  It first pointed out that “being a sex offender does not, in 
itself, imply a mental disorder or mental illness.”85  It then critiqued 
the statute’s requirement that an individual have a “mental abnor-
mality” on the grounds that the term is not clinically meaningful and 
is in disuse. 
In contrast, the Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers 
submitted an amicus brief arguing that the term “mental abnormali-
ty” did have a specific meaning to mental health professionals.86 
Neither the National Mental Health Association nor the Washing-
ton State Psychiatric Association persuaded Justice Thomas.  He 
wrote, “Contrary to Hendricks’ assertion, the term ‘mental illness’ is 
devoid of any talismanic significance.  Not only do ‘psychiatrists dis-
agree widely and frequently on what constitutes mental illness,’ but 
the Court itself has used a variety of expressions to describe the men-
tal condition of those properly subject to civil confinement.”87  Since 
the Court has “traditionally left to legislators the task of defining 
terms of a medical nature that have legal significance,”88 it was ac-
ceptable for the Kansas legislature to use the standard of “mental ab-
 
 83 Id. 
 84 Brief for the National Mental Health Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respon-
dent, Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (No. 95-1649), 1996 WL 471077 at *7. 
 85 Brief for Washington State Pyschiatric Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respon-
dent, Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (No. 95-1649), 1996 WL 468611 at *7–8. 
 86 Brief for Association of the Treatment of Sexual Abusers as Amicus Curiae Washington 
Supporting Petitioner, Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (No. 95-1649), 1996 WL 471027 at *3. 
 87 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 359 (citations omitted). 
 88 Id. 
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normality.”  The Court then considered Hendricks’ claim that the Act 
violated the Constitution’s ban on double jeopardy and ex post facto 
laws by creating a new law that punished him for past conduct for 
which he had already been convicted and served time.89  The analysis 
hinged on whether the Act was civil or criminal.  The Court noted—
and took deference to—the stated intent of the Kansas legislature 
that the Act was civil.  It then discussed the two goals of punishment:  
retribution and deterrence.  With regards to retribution, the Court 
held that the Act was not retributive because the prior criminal con-
duct was admitted not to “affix culpability” but instead to show that a 
“mental abnormality” existed in order to prove that the individual 
still posed a risk.90  The Court found that the Act was not aimed at de-
terrence because individuals were unlikely to be deterred (due to the 
very nature of their mental disorder).91 
Holding that the SVP law was civil and not criminal has had a pro-
found effect on the procedural protections afforded to accused sex-
ually violent predators.  Even though most SVPs face indefinite com-
mitment to a locked facility, they do not have the same rights as 
someone charged with committing a misdemeanor.  Part IV will dis-
cuss these reduced protections in more detail. 
B.  Kansas v. Crane 
In Kansas v. Crane the Court clarified what it had meant in Hen-
dricks when it said that the “mental abnormality” or “personality dis-
order” must make it “difficult if not impossible for the person to con-
trol his behavior.”92  Michael Crane, also a convicted sex offender, 
appealed his commitment as a sexually violent predator.  The Kansas 
Supreme Court overturned the commitment on the grounds that the 
federal Constitution, as interpreted in Hendricks, required that the de-
fendant be unable to control his dangerous behavior, but no such 
finding had been made at trial.93  The state of Kansas appealed, ar-
guing that the Kansas Supreme Court had interpreted the holding in 
Hendricks too restrictively.94  In a 7-2 decision, the Court agreed and 
vacated the Kansas Supreme Court’s judgment. 
 
 89 Id. at 361. 
 90 Id. at 362. 
 91 Id. at 362–63. 
 92 Id. at 358 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-20a02(b) (1994)). 
 93 Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 411 (2002). 
 94 Id. at 409. 
Dec. 2011] THROWING AWAY THE KEY 407 
 
Despite the fact that the Hendricks opinion had specifically de-
scribed the Kansas law as being akin to laws that provided for the 
“forcible civil detainment of people who are unable to control their 
behavior,”95 the Court now held that the state did not need to prove 
an inability to control.  Yet the Court did not adopt Kansas’s position 
that a person could be committed as a sexually violent predator 
“without any lack of control determination.”96  Instead, the Court 
held that the standard was “proof of serious difficulty in controlling 
behavior.”97  The Court noted that a large population of the prison 
population is mentally ill.  To ensure that the confinement remains 
civil and not criminal, the Court stated that the sexually violent pre-
dator must be distinguishable from other sex offenders:  “The severity 
of the mental abnormality itself, must be sufficient to distinguish the 
dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental illness, abnormality, 
or disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the dangerous but 
typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary case.”98 
C.  United States v. Comstock 
In United States v. Comstock,99 the Supreme Court upheld the Adam 
Walsh Act, which eroded these procedural protections even further.  
In 2006, the government instituted proceedings in district court to 
commit Comstock and four other respondents as sexually dangerous 
persons under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act.  The 
respondents moved to dismiss on constitutional grounds.  They ar-
gued that the Act was criminal and not civil and thus violated double 
jeopardy, the Ex Post Facto Clause, and the Sixth and Eighth 
Amendments.  They argued further that the Act denied them subs-
tantive due process and equal protection under the law.  They also 
claimed that setting the burden of proof at clear and convincing evi-
dence violated their procedural due process rights.  Finally, they ar-
gued that in passing the statute, Congress had exceeded its power 
under the Necessary and Proper Clause, Article 1, Section 8 of the 
U.S. Constitution. 
The district court granted the motion to dismiss on grounds that 
the Constitution required the standard of proof beyond a reasonable 
 
 95 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357. 
 96 Crane, 534 U.S. at 412 (emphasis in original). 
 97 Id. at 413. 
 98 Id. 
 99 United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1954 (2010). 
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doubt and that the Act exceeded congressional power.100  On appeal, 
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the dismissal on 
grounds that the law exceeded Congress’s powers under Article 1, 
Section 8 of the Constitution.101  The Fourth Circuit did not decide 
the standard of proof question; nor did it consider any of the other 
constitutional arguments raised below. 
By a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit 
and held that the Adam Walsh Act did not exceed Congressional 
power.102  In its decision, the majority did not address the most troub-
ling part of the law—that people can be indefinitely committed to a 
locked facility as sexually dangerous persons even though they were 
never convicted of, or even charged with, a sex crime.  This signifi-
cant deprivation of procedural rights did not even warrant a footnote 
in the majority opinion. 
The Adam Walsh Act significantly expands who may be civilly 
committed under federal law and goes well beyond the law in almost 
every state.  Currently, every SVP state except New York and North 
Dakota follows Kansas and requires that a person have been first con-
victed or found not guilty by reason of insanity of a sexually violent 
offense.  Some states allow commitment proceedings against some-
one who was deemed incompetent to stand trial but only after the 
judge first conducts a hearing in which the prosecutor must prove the 
defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  In stark contrast, the 
Adam Walsh Act only requires that the government prove by clear 
and convincing evidence that the accused sexually violent predator 
committed a sexually violent offense or child molestation.103 
This diminished procedural protection did not escape the notice 
of all judges.  In ruling the law unconstitutional, the Fourth Circuit 
specifically noted how much “more narrowly drawn” the state statutes 
were than the federal one.104  Indeed, in his dissent, Justice Thomas 
was extremely critical of this aspect of the statute: 
[T]he statute’s definition of a “sexually dangerous person” contains no 
element relating to the subject’s crime.  It thus does not require a federal 
court to find any connection between the reasons supporting civil com-
mitment and the enumerated power with which that persons’ criminal 
conduct interfered.  As a consequence, § 4248 allows a court to civilly 
commit an individual without finding that he was ever charged with or 
 
100 United States v. Comstock, 551 F.3d 274, 275 (4th Cir. 2009), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 1949 
(2010). 
101 Id. at 284. 
102 Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956, 1965. 
103 18 U.S.C. § 4248d (2006). 
104 Comstock, 551 F.3d at 277 n.2. 
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convicted of a federal crime involving sexual violence.  That possibility is 
not merely hypothetical:  The Government concedes that nearly 20% of 
individuals against whom § 4248 proceedings have been brought fit this 
description.105 
IV.  SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR LAWS ACROSS THE COUNTRY 
As described above, the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld the right 
of states to lock up people indefinitely with minimal procedural pro-
tections.  In discussing how the Supreme Court should respond to a 
future procedural due process challenge of the Adam Walsh Act, it is 
helpful to first gain an understanding of sexually violent predator leg-
islation across the country.  This Part will begin by discussing the de-
fining features of sexually violent predator laws.  It will then offer a 
state-by-state look at the number, type, and cost of SVP commitments.  
Subsequently, it will describe the procedural protections afforded by 
each state. 
A.  The Proliferation of Sexually Violent Predator Laws Across the United 
States 
Currently, twenty states and the federal government have enacted 
laws calling for the involuntary civil commitment of sexually violent 
predators.106  These states include:  Arizona, California, Florida, Illi-
nois, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, 
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, 
South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.107  By 
the summer of 2008, states had committed more than 3718 individu-
als as sexually violent predators.108 
1.  Date of SVP Passage, Length/Type of Commitment and Number of 
People Committed 
There is little variation in terms of the length and type of com-
mitment mandated under the nation’s sexually violent predator laws.  
 
105 Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1977 (citations omitted). 
106 18 U.S.C. § 4248 (2006); Michael Cooper, Senate Passes Bill to Detain Sex Offenders After Pris-
on, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2007, at B3 (recounting New York’s passage of a law calling for in-
voluntary civil commitment of sexually violent predators); Monica Davey & Abby Good-
nough, Doubts Rise as States Hold Sex Offenders After Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2007, at A1 
(listing all twenty states that have enacted such laws except New York). 
107 Davey & Goodnough, supra note 106 (listing all of the above states except New York be-
cause it had not yet passed its sexually violent predator law). 
108 See Table 2. 
410 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 14:2 
 
In almost all states, and in the federal system, commitment as a sex-
ually violent predator means an indeterminate commitment to a 
locked mental hospital.109 
There are some exceptions.  North Dakota specifically states that a 
sexually violent predator should be placed in the least restrictive 
available treatment facility or program necessary to achieve the goals 
of the statute.110  Virginia also provides for less restrictive alternatives 
to involuntary, secure, inpatient treatment.111  Also of note, New 
Hampshire orders that sexually violent predators be committed to a 
secure psychiatric unit, but the order of commitment is only valid for 
five years.112  Texas is unique in that it only provides for outpatient 
treatment; however it requires that the person reside in a Texas resi-
dential facility.113  If the person subsequently violates any terms of his 
release, he may be prosecuted and sent into custody.114 
In 2008, I wrote to each of the states that had passed sexually vio-
lent predator legislation and asked for data regarding commitments 
in their state.  Specifically, I requested information on the number of 
commitments, the number in the process of being committed, the 
number released, the types of offenses those committed had been 
convicted of, and a breakdown of SVPs by race, gender, and age.  I 
received data from all of the states except Florida and Nebraska.  I 
received incomplete data from Massachusetts.  For these three states I 
used data that was published in a 2007 New York Times article. 115  Since 
that data was collected in 2006, and since the laws are still in effect, I 
am assuming that these states had more committed SVP’s in 2008 
than they did in 2006. 
Table 2 shows that few people committed as SVPs have ever been 
released.  For instance, by 2008, California had committed 808 
people as sexually violent predators; yet over that same thirteen-year 
period, just twenty-four people were released.  The fact that just 3% 
 
109 18 U.S.C. § 4248(d) (2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3707(B)(1) (2009); CAL. WELF. & 
INST. CODE § 6604 (West 2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.917(2) (West 2006); 725 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/40(a) (West 2008); IOWA CODE ANN. § 229A.7(5) (West 2006); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07(a) (2005); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A, § 14(d) (LexisNexis 
2003); MINN. STAT. § 253B.185(1) (2008); MO. ANN. STAT. § 632.495 (West 2006); NEB. 
REV. STAT. § 71-1209(4) (2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.32(a) (West 2009); N.Y. 
MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.07(f) (McKinney 2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-100(A) (2008); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.060(1) (West 2008); WIS. STAT. § 980.06 (2008). 
110 N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-13 (2008). 
111 VA. CODE. ANN. § 37.2-908(E) (2009). 
112 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-E:11 (LexisNexis 2008). 
113 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.081(a) (West 2009). 
114 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.085 (West 2009). 
115 Davey & Goodnough, supra note 106, at A1. 
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of SVPs have been released is important because it shows that the de-
privation of liberty under the sexually violent predator laws is signifi-
cant.  Recent history suggests that once a person is committed as an 
SVP, it is unlikely that he will ever be released. 
2.  SVP Laws Across the Country:  Procedural Protections 
In 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court held that sexually violent preda-
tor commitments are civil and not criminal.116  This ruling meant that 
accused sexually violent predators are not entitled to the same pa-
noply of procedural protections that criminal defendants possess.117  
Yet as this Part will show, most states provide accused sexually violent 
predators with more rights than the constitutional minimum. 
Although the government is not constitutionally required to pro-
vide counsel to indigent SVPs,118 all states and the federal government 
do so.119  Guaranteeing SVPs counsel is important because “[t]he 
right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not 
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.”120    
One of the most significant differences between states regarding 
the protections provided to accused SVPs is the right to a jury trial.  
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that “(i)n all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a . . . trial, by an impartial 
jury.”121  The Supreme Court has held that the right to jury trial at-
taches when a criminal defendant is facing more than six months in 
 
116 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997). 
117 Although the Court in Hendricks did not lay out which procedural protections are due to 
accused individuals in SVP cases, it is possible to figure them out by looking at other Su-
preme Court cases.  Table 2 of this Article includes an entry for Hendricks along with the 
implied protections. 
118  Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 500 (1980).  
119  18 U.S.C. § 4247(d) (2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-3704(C) (2008); CAL. WELF. & INST. 
CODE § 6603(a) (West 2011); FLA. STAT. § 394.916(3) (2011); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
207/25(c)(1) (2008); IOWA CODE § 229A.6(1) (2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a06(b) 
(2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A, § 13(c) (2011); MINN. STAT. § 253B.07(2)(c)(2010); 
MO. REV. STAT. § 632.492 (2011); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71.945 (2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
135-E:11(III) (2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.31(a) (2008); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW 
§ 10.06(c) (McKinney 2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-09(3) (2011); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. 
§ 9795.4(e)(2) (2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-90(B) (2010); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY 
CODE ANN. § 841.005 (2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-901 (2011); WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 71.09.050(1) (2011); WIS. STAT. § 980.03(2)(a) (2011); see also People v. Fraser, 138 Cal. 
App. 4th 1430 (2006) (holding that person did not have the right to self-representation 
in a recommitment proceeding under the Sixth Amendment). 
120  Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932). 
121 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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jail.122  Because SVP commitments are classified as civil, the Sixth 
Amendment right does not apply, which means that individuals fac-
ing indefinite lifetime commitment have less protection than those 
facing 181 days in jail.  Most states do give accused sexually violent 
persons the right to a jury trial,123 but as Table 4 below shows, they dif-
fer on how many jurors are required to render a verdict.124  Only five 
states and the federal government125 do not guarantee this right:  
Minnesota,126 Nebraska,127 New Jersey,128 North Dakota,129 and Pennsyl-
vania.130 
 
122 See United States v. Nachtigal, 507 U.S. 1, 3 (1993) (per curiam) (“[I]n order to deter-
mine whether the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial attaches to a particular offense, 
the court must examine objective indications of the seriousness with which society re-
gards the offense.  The best indicator of society’s views is the maximum penalty set by the 
legislature.  While the word ‘penalty’ refers both to the term of imprisonment and other 
statutory penalties, . . . primary emphasis . . . must be placed on the maximum authorized 
period of incarceration.  . . . [O]ffenses for which the maximum period of incarceration 
is six months or less are presumptively ‘petty.’” (citations omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
123 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3707(A) (2009); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6603(a) (West 
2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.917(1) (West 2006); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/40(a) 
(2008); IOWA CODE ANN. § 229A.7(4) (West 2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a06(c) (2005); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A, § 14(a) (LexisNexis 2003); MO. ANN. STAT. § 632.492 (West 
2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-E:11 (LexisNexis 2008); N.Y. MENTAL HYG LAW. 
§ 10.07(a) (McKinney 2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-100(A) (2008); TEX. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.062(a) (West 2009); VA. CODE. ANN. § 37.2-908(B) (2009); VA. 
CODE. ANN. § 37.2-908(C) (2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.060(1) (West 2008); 
WIS. STAT. § 980.06 (2008). 
124 IOWA CONST. art. I, § 9 (permitting fewer than twelve jurors to render a verdict); CAL. 
WELF. & INST. CODE § 6603(c)(2)(f) (West 2009) (requiring a unanimous verdict); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 69.071 (West 2004); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/25(d) (2008) (requiring 
a unanimous verdict); IOWA CODE ANN. § 229A.7(5) (West 2000) (requiring a unanimous 
verdict); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a06(d) (2005) (requiring twelve jurors unless the parties 
and court agree to fewer); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07(a) (2005) (requiring a unanimous 
verdict); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A, § 14(d) (LexisNexis 2003) (requiring a unanimous 
verdict); MO. ANN. STAT. § 632.495(1) (West 2006) (requiring a unanimous verdict); N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-E:11(I) (LexisNexis 2008) (requiring a unanimous verdict); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 44-48-100(A) (2008) (requiring a unanimous verdict); TEX. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.062(b) (West 2009) (requiring a unanimous verdict); VA. CODE. 
ANN. § 37.2-908(B) (2009) (requiring a unanimous verdict); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 71.09.060(1) (West 2008) (requiring a unanimous verdict); WIS. STAT. § 980.05(2), 
(2)(b) (2010) (requiring twelve jurors unless the parties agree otherwise); see also State v. 
Denman, 626 N.W.2d 296, 297 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that a unanimous verdict is 
required but not that the defendant be made aware of that fact); Romley v. Superior 
Court, 7 P.3d 970, 972 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that out of eight jurors, six must 
concur to render a verdict). 
125 18 U.S.C. § 4248(a), (d) (2006). 
126 MINN. STAT. § 253B.185(1) (2008); In re Civil Commitment of Thompson, No. 76-PR-06-
990, 2007 Minn. Ct. App. LEXIS 1190, at *1, *13 (Dec. 11, 2007) (holding that the Min-
nesota State Constitution does not mandate a jury trial in civil commitment proceedings). 
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New York, in contrast, gives the defendant a right to a hybrid 
jury/bench trial.  The person has the right to have a jury make the 
initial finding that he is a “detained sex offender who suffers from a 
mental abnormality.”131  If the jury so unanimously finds,132 then it is 
the judge who must decide whether the person is a “dangerous sex 
offender requiring confinement or a sex offender requiring strict and 
intensive supervision.”133 
Standard of proof is another area of variance.  According to the 
U.S. Supreme Court, the burden of proof that the state must meet is 
“clear and convincing evidence,” not the more stringent standard of 
“beyond a reasonable doubt.”134  Despite the fact that states are not 
required to demand this higher burden, nine states do:  Arizona,135 
California,136 Illinois,137 Iowa,138 Kansas,139 Massachusetts,140 South Caro-
lina,141 Texas,142 Washington,143 and Wisconsin.144  In contrast, ten 
states and the federal government set the burden of proof at clear 
and convincing evidence.145 
In addition, because the commitments are civil and not criminal, 
respondents do not have a federal constitutional right to competen-
cy.  Arizona,146 Iowa,147 Kansas,148 Massachusetts,149 Missouri,150 South 
 
127 In Nebraska, the district court reviews the findings of a mental health board.  NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 71-1208 (2008). 
128 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.31 (West 2009). 
129 State v. Anderson, 730 N.W.2d 570, 571 (N.D. 2007). 
130 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9795.4(e)(2) (West 2007). 
131 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. § 10.07(d) (McKinney 2011). 
132 Id. 
133 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. § 10.07(f) (McKinney 2011). 
134 Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 86 (1992). 
135 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3707(A) (2009). 
136 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6604 (West 2009). 
137 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 207/35(d)(2) (West 2008). 
138 IOWA CODE ANN. § 229A.7(5) (West 2008). 
139 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07(a) (2008). 
140 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 123A, § 14(d) (LexisNexis 2003). 
141 S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-100(A) (2008). 
142 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.062(a) (West 2008). 
143 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.060(1) (West 2008). 
144 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 980.05(3)(a) (West 2008). 
145 18 U.S.C. § 4248(d) (2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.917(1) (West 2009); MO. ANN. STAT. 
§ 632.495 (West 2011); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-1209(1) (2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-
E:11(1) (LexisNexis 2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.32(a) (West 2009); N.Y. MENTAL 
HYG. § 10.07(d) (McKinney 2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-13 (2007); 42 PA. CONS. 
STAT. § 9795.4(e)(3) (2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-908(C) (2009); In re Linehan, 557 
N.W.2d 171, 179 (Minn. 1996), vacated Linehan v. Minnesota, 522 U.S. 1011 (1997). 
146 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3707(D) (2009). 
147 IOWA CODE § 229A.7(1) (West 2009). 
148 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07(g) (2008). 
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Carolina,151 Texas,152 Virginia,153 Washington,154 and Wisconsin155 have 
all held that individuals do not have the right to be competent at 
their sexually violent predator trial.  In August 2010, the California 
Supreme Court ruled that due process does not require that a person 
be mentally competent when undergoing a commitment or recom-
mitment trial as a sexually violent predator.156  New Hampshire allows 
a limited right to competency.157 
Nor do those accused of being a sexually violent predator enjoy 
the right against self-incrimination.158  Some states like Arizona,159 Cal-
ifornia,160 and Missouri161 allow the prosecution to call the individual 
to the stand against his will.  Other states like Kansas,162 New Jersey,163 
Pennsylvania,164 and Texas165 allow the person to be compelled to un-
dergo a state psychological or psychiatric exam.  Florida,166 Massachu-
 
149 Commonwealth v. Nieves, 846 N.E.2d 379, 385–86 (Mass. 2006). 
150 State ex rel. Nixon v. Kinder, 129 S.W.3d 5, 8–11 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003). 
151 See S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-100(B) (2008).  If a person is deemed incompetent, the judge 
will hold a hearing in which they will decide if the state can prove the person’s guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  If so, civil commitment can proceed.  Id. 
152 In re Commitment of Fisher, 164 S.W.3d 637, 653–54 (Tex. 2005). 
153 VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-905 (2005). 
154 WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 71.09.060(2) (West 2008).  Washington has a similar procedure 
to South Carolina.  See supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
155 State v. Luttrell (In re Commitment of Luttrell), 754 N.W.2d 249, 252 (Wis. Ct. App. 
2008). 
156 Moore v. Super. Ct., 237 P.3d 530, 544 (Cal. 2010). 
157 See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-E:5(1), (2) (LexisNexis 2008).  If a person is charged with 
a sexually violent offense but deemed incompetent for trial, he is held for ninety days.  Id.  
If he remains incompetent to stand trial, a judge will determine whether he committed 
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id.  If so, commitment may proceed.  Id. 
158 Allen v. Illinois held that the privilege against self-incrimination did not apply in sexually 
dangerous person proceedings because they were “essentially civil in nature.”  478 U.S. 
364, 367, 375 (1986).  The goal of the statute was “treatment, not punishment.”  Id. 
159 See State ex rel. Romley v. Sheldon, 7 P.3d 118, 120–21 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that 
a person charged with a sexually violent offense “may not assert the privilege against self-
incrimination as a reason to refuse to attend a deposition”). 
160 See People v. Leonard, 78 Cal. App. 4th 776, 792 (2000) (holding that the constitutional 
right to remain silent did not apply to persons charged with sexually violent offenses). 
161 Bernat v. State, 194 S.W.3d 863, 870 (Mo. 2006) (holding that the state has a “compelling 
interest in ensuring that the jury or judge makes a reliable determination of whether the 
person sought to be committed is an SVP,” while other persons, in contrast, subject to civ-
il commitment in Missouri do have the right against self-incrimination). 
162 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a08(c)(2006). 
163 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.28(b) (West 2009). 
164 Commonwealth v. Howe, 842 A.2d 436, 445 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004). 
165 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.061(f) (West 2008). 
166 FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.360(a)(1)(A). 
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setts,167 and New Hampshire168 allow individuals to refuse a state exam; 
however, the price of refusal is that their own experts can be prohi-
bited from testifying.  In New York, upon request, the court will in-
struct the jurors if the individual refused to be examined by a state 
psychologist.169  Illinois,170 Iowa,171 Virginia,172 and Wisconsin173 stand 
out in giving accused sexually violent predators the right to remain 
silent. 
Despite these differences, there are two important similarities 
among sexually violent predator states that serve to limit the number 
of people who can be committed.  First, all states except New York174 
and North Dakota175 require that the person have been convicted of 
at least one sexually violent offense or have been charged with a sex-
ually violent offense but found incompetent or not guilty by reason of 
insanity, mental disease, or mental defect.176  In addition, the states 
 
167 Commonwealth v. Connors, 447 Mass. 313, 319 (2006) (holding that the defendant could 
not selectively invoke the privilege to refuse to speak with qualified psychiatric examin-
ers). 
168 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-E:9(IV) (Lexis Nexis 2008). 
169 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. § 10.07(d) (McKinney 2011). 
170 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/25(c)(2) (West 2008). 
171 IOWA CODE § 229A.7(1) (2008). 
172 VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-901 (2005). 
173 State v. Harrell (In re Commitment of Harrell), 747 N.W.2d 770, 778 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008). 
174 The New York statute states: 
The respondent’s commission of a sex offense shall be deemed established and 
shall not be relitigated at the trial, whenever it is shown that:  (i) the respondent 
stands convicted of such offense; or (ii) the respondent previously has been found 
not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect for the commission of such 
offense or for an act or acts constituting such offense.  Whenever the petition al-
leges the respondent’s commission of a designated felony prior to the effective 
date of this article, the issue of whether such offense was sexually motivated shall 
be determined by the jury. 
  N.Y. MENTAL HYG. § 10.07(c) (McKinney 2011) (emphasis added); see also State v. Andre 
L., 924 N.Y.S.2d 467, 469 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (affirming the trial court’s finding that an 
offender’s first degree robbery conviction was sexually motivated and dangerous enough 
to require confinement because he suffered from a mental abnormality based on evi-
dence “[he] left his home dressed in women's undergarments with the intention of ex-
posing himself, and the robbery was an additional element that was part of the thrill in-
volving sexual arousal”). 
175 North Dakota does not explicitly require a charge or conviction but instead requires that 
the sexually violent person is “an individual who is shown to have engaged in sexually 
predatory conduct.”  N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-01 (2008). 
176 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3702 (2009); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE  § 6600(a)(1) (West 
Supp. 2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.912(10)(a) (West Supp. 2009); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 207/15(3)(b)(1) (West Supp. 2008) (Illinois also allows a finding of delinquency 
for a sexually violent offense); IOWA CODE ANN. § 229A.2(11), 229A.7 (West Supp. 2009) 
(in Iowa, before a person who was found incompetent or not guilty by reason of insanity 
can be committed as a sexually violent predator, the court must first find beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that he committed the underlying sexually violent offense); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 59-29a07(g) (2008) (in Kansas, before a person who was found incompetent can 
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and federal government closely follow the Supreme Court language 
in Hendricks and Crane,177 in that they require the person to have a 
current mental disorder or abnormality that causes him to have se-
rious difficulty controlling himself such that he poses the risk of 
committing future acts of sexual violence.178 
3.  Discussion 
As this Part has shown, most states offer more than the minimum 
constitutional protections required by the U.S. Supreme Court.  The 
majority of states (fifteen of twenty) offer accused sexually violent 
predators more procedural protections than required by the Su-
preme Court.  Indeed, of the twelve states that passed sexually violent 
predator laws after Hendricks, nine give accused SVPs the right to a 
jury trial, and of these, four set the standard of proof at beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. 
These results may seem surprising in light of the fact that sex 
crimes evoke such serious passions, and politicians are eager to show 
 
be committed as a sexually violent predator, the court must find beyond a reasonable 
doubt that he committed the underlying sexually violent offense); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 
123A § 1 (LexisNexis 2003); MINN. STAT. § 253B.02(18c)(a)(1) (2009) (Minnesota re-
quires that the person have “engaged in a course of harmful sexual conduct”); MO. ANN. 
STAT. § 632.480(5) (West 2006); NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-174.01(1) (2008); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 135-E:2(XII) (LexisNexis Supp. 2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.26(b) (West 
2008); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9792 (West 2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-30(1)(a) 
(Supp. 2008); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.003 (West 2009); VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 37.2-900 (2009); WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020(18) (2010); WIS. STAT. § 980.01(7) 
(2011). 
177 534 U.S. 407 (2002).  In Crane, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified what the state had to 
prove in terms of a sexually violent predator’s ability to control himself. Id. at 413.  “[W]e 
recognize that in cases where lack of control is at issue, ‘inability to control behavior’ will 
not be demonstrable with mathematical precision.  It is enough to say that there must be 
proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior.”  Id.  
178 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600 (a)(1) (West Supp. 2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 394.912(10)(b) (West Supp. 2009); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/15(3)(C)(5) (West 
Supp. 2008) (note Illinois’ formulation:  “The person is dangerous to others because the 
person’s mental disorder creates a substantial probability that he or she will engage in 
acts of sexual violence”); IOWA CODE ANN. § 229A.2 (West Supp. 2009); MASS. ANN. LAWS 
ch. 123A § 1 (LexisNexis 2003); MINN. STAT. § 253B.02(18c) (2009); MO. ANN. STAT. 
§ 632.480(5) (West 2006); NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-174.01 (2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 135-E:2(XII) (LexisNexis Supp. 2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.26 (West 2008); N.Y. 
MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.07(f) (McKinney 2011); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9792 (West 
2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-30 (Supp. 2008); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. 
§ 841.003 (West 2009) (Texas uses the language “suffers from a behavioral abnormality 
that makes the person likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence”); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 37.2-900 (2009); WASH. REV. CODE 71.09.020(18) (2010); WIS. STAT. § 980.01(7) 
(2009 Supp. 2011); 18 U.S.C. § 4247 (5),(6) (LexisNexis 2008); State v. Ehrlich (In re 
Leon G.), 59 P.3d 779, 787 (Ariz. 2002). 
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that they are tough on criminals.179  Yet as the next Part will discuss, 
affording extra procedural protections to accused sexually violent 
predators makes sense from a constitutional and public policy pers-
pective. 
V. DOES THE ADAM WALSH ACT VIOLATE PROCEDURAL DUE 
PROCESS? 
In United States v. Comstock, the Supreme Court upheld the Adam 
Walsh Act on narrow constitutional grounds.  Although Comstock et 
al. argued at the lower court level that the Act violated their rights to 
procedural and substantive due process as well as equal protection 
under the law, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit did not 
consider these arguments but instead upheld the dismissal on 
grounds that the law exceeded Congress’s powers under Article 1, 
Section 8 of the Constitution.180  In its decision, the Supreme Court 
held only that Congress had not exceeded its power under the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause.  It specifically left open the other constitu-
tional claims.181 
In determining whether federal inmates may even raise a proce-
dural due process violation, they must first establish that a constitu-
tionally protected interest is at stake.  The Fourteenth Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution protects persons against deprivations of life, li-
berty, or property.  In this instance, inmates face lifetime incarcera-
tion in a locked mental hospital, and the Court has held that there is 
a liberty interest in avoiding involuntary psychiatric treatment and 
transfer to a mental institution.182 
A.  The Significance of State Protections 
In determining whether the Adam Walsh Act violates inmates’ 
procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution, it makes sense to begin by comparing the fed-
 
179 See, e.g., KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY:  LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY 
AMERICAN POLITICS (1997) (arguing that the root of tough anti-crime policies in the 
United States was political and not, as is popularly believed, due to an increase in the in-
cidence of crime); see also BARRY GLASSNER, THE CULTURE OF FEAR:  WHY AMERICANS ARE 
AFRAID OF THE WRONG THINGS 148–50 (1999) (noting that in his reelection campaign, 
President Clinton signed a bill “demonstrating his opposition both to drug abuse and ac-
quaintance rape”). 
180 United States v. Comstock, 551 F.3d 274, 284–85 (4th Cir. 2009), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 1949. 
181 United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1965 (2010). 
182 Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493–94 (1980). 
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eral law with state protections.  In questions of substantive due 
process, the Court often looks both historically and contempora-
neously across states.  For instance, the Court looked to state legisla-
tion in deciding that there was a national consensus against execu-
tion for rape of an adult woman,183 rape of a child,184 execution of the 
insane,185 execution of fifteen,186 sixteen, and seventeen year old juve-
niles,187 and execution of the “mentally retarded.”188  Similarly, in Law-
rence v. Texas, the Court looked to evolving standards of private, con-
sensual sexual conduct as evidenced by laws across the country to 
strike down the anti-sodomy law previously upheld in Bowers v. Hard-
wick as a violation of a constitutionally protected liberty.189 
Just as there are evolving standards in the substantive due process 
context, so are there evolving standards in the procedural context.  
In Medina v. California, Justice O’Connor cited Justice Frankfurter’s 
concurring opinion in Griffin v. Illinois for the proposition that  
[t]he concept of due process is, “perhaps, the least frozen concept of our 
law—the least confined to history and the most absorptive of powerful 
social standards of a progressive society.  But neither the unfolding con-
tent of ‘due process’ nor the particularized safeguards of the Bill of 
Rights disregard procedural ways that reflect a national historic policy.”190 
If the Court looks at state practices across the country, it will see 
that almost all relevant states grant more procedural rights to SVPs 
than the federal government grants them under the Adam Walsh Act.  
Indeed, out of all twenty SVP states, only North Dakota allows a per-
son to be committed as an SVP who has never been convicted of, or 
charged with, a sex crime.  Such a consensus certainly reflects the 
kind of national historic policy that the Court should not ignore. 
Furthermore, paying attention to what the states are doing in the 
SVP context avoids the sorts of federalism concerns that exist in the 
Eighth Amendment context.191  In striking down the Adam Walsh Act, 
 
183 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977). 
184 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421, 469 (2008). 
185 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 408–10 (1986). 
186 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 826–29, 838 (1988). 
187 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574–75 (2005). 
188 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). 
189 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 
(1986). 
190 Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 454 (1992) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing Griffin 
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20–21 (1956)). 
191 See Tonja Jacobi, The Subtle Unraveling of Federalism:  The Illogic of Using State Legislation as 
Evidence of an Evolving National Consensus, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1089, 1133 (2006) (“[B]y incor-
porating the counting and characterizing of state legislation into Eighth Amendment ju-
risprudence, the Supreme Court has lumbered that jurisprudence with all of the prob-
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the Court would actually be deferring to the states instead of sup-
planting them.  As the Court states in Medina v. California, “[B]ecause 
the States have considerable expertise in matters of criminal proce-
dure and the criminal process is grounded in centuries of common-
law tradition, it is appropriate to exercise substantial deference to leg-
islative judgments in this area.”192  Of course, as the Court held in 
Hendricks, SVP commitments are not actually classified as criminal.193  
But still, in deciding whether to uphold outlier legislation like the 
Adam Walsh Act, the Court should pay attention to the consensus 
that exists across SVP states regarding procedural protections af-
forded to SVPs. 
B.  Applying the Mathews v. Eldridge Balancing Test 
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld194 and Wilkinson v. Austin,195 the Court used 
the balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge196 to assess whether the 
state had afforded sufficient procedural due process under the Con-
stitution to protect a defendant’s liberty.  These decisions are signifi-
cant because they clearly show that the balancing test has replaced 
the more nebulous standards of due process that were used previous-
ly.197  Thus, this Article will apply the Eldridge balancing test in deter-
mining whether the Adam Walsh Act violates procedural due process. 
Eldridge dictates that in determining the requirements of due 
process in a particular circumstance, three factors must be consi-
dered:  
the private interest that will be affected by the official action; . . . the risk 
of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures 
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute proce-
dural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the 
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the ad-
ditional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.198 
Without question, the private interest at stake is significant.  The 
Adam Walsh Act allows the federal government to deprive people of 
 
lems associated with the ‘indeterminacy of levels of generality’ that plague other areas of 
constitutional law.”). 
192 Medina, 505 U.S. at 445–46. 
193   Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997). 
194 542 U.S. 507, 531 (2004). 
195 545 U.S. 209, 224–25 (2005). 
196 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
197 See, e.g., Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 226 (1976) (“The touchstone of due process is 
protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government.” (citations omitted) 
(quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974))). 
198 Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335. 
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their freedom indefinitely.  Indeed, history has shown that once a 
person is committed as a sexually violent predator, it’s unlikely that 
he will ever be released.199  In Foucha v. Louisiana, the Court con-
firmed the significance of incarceration:  “Freedom from bodily re-
straint has always been at the core of liberty protected by the Due 
Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action.”200 
Next, the courts must assess the risk of an erroneous deprivation 
of liberty due to the procedures used, and the probable value of addi-
tional safeguards.  As discussed above, sex offenders have a very low 
rate of recidivism.201  Just 5.3% of sex offenders were rearrested for a 
new sex crime within three years of release from prison.202  In addi-
tion, because accused SVPs are older, they are likely to be at even 
lower risk of reoffending.203  Thus, even with ordinary due process 
protections in place, a significant danger exists that the government 
will lock someone away who would not reoffend if released.  Eliminat-
ing the requirement that a person have actually been convicted of, or 
at least charged with, a sex crime only increases the risk of false posi-
tives. 
Last, courts need to consider the governmental interest at stake 
and the burdens of additional protections.  Without a doubt, the gov-
ernment has an important interest in protecting the safety of men, 
women, and children against predatory sex offenders.  Yet the weight 
of that interest is directly related to the risk posed:  the greater the 
danger, the greater the governmental interest.  Not only are sex of-
fenders unlikely to recidivate, but the overall incidence of sex crimes 
has been dropping for the past two decades. 
According to the Uniform Crime Reports,204 the number of forci-
ble rapes known to the police reached its peak in 1992.205  From 1993 
 
199 See supra Table 2. 
200 Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 
316 (1982)). 
201 See supra notes 19–37 and accompanying text. 
202 DOJ, supra note 21, at 24. 
203 See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text. 
204 The FBI began compiling the Uniform Crime Reports in 1930 from law enforcement 
agencies across the country.  Marvin E. Wolfgang, Uniform Crime Reports:  A Critical Ap-
praisal, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 708, 710 (1963).  Although participation has increased dramati-
cally since 1930, it is purely voluntary, and as a result some agencies do not provide data.  
Uniform Crime Reports:  A Word About UCR Data, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/word (last visited Nov. 22, 2011). 
205 See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 
2009, at tbl.1 (2010), available at http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/data/table_01.html 
(showing the number of forcible rapes between 1990 and 2009 and showing that there 
were 109,062 forcible rapes in 1992). 
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through 2010, the number of forcible rapes known to police has con-
tinued to decrease with few exceptions.206  The rate of forcible rapes 
per 100,000 persons in the U.S. has also consistently dropped, from a 
high of 42.8 in 1992 to 28.7 in 2009.207 
In addition, the number of substantiated cases of child sexual 
abuse has been steadily decreasing during this same time period.208  
The National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System (“NCANDS”) ag-
gregates and publishes statistics from child protection agencies across 
the country, including all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and 
Puerto Rico.209  It has been collecting, analyzing, and publishing a re-
port on this data for the past 20 years.210  Researchers analyzed the 
NCANDS data and found that sexual abuse of children has dropped 
58% from 1992 to 2008.211 
Considering all three parts of the Eldridge test—the significant li-
berty interests at stake, the elevated risk that a person may be com-
mitted erroneously due to the procedures used, and the important 
governmental interest—it seems clear that the expansive commit-
ment criteria in the Adam Walsh Act violate the due process rights of 
accused sexually violent predators.  Consequently, states should not 
follow in the federal government’s footsteps. 
If the Court allows the government to commit individuals as sex-
ually violent predators who have never been charged with a sex 
crime, the Court—whether intentionally or not—creates an incentive 
for the government to circumvent Sixth Amendment protections.  
Currently, in eighteen of the twenty SVP states, the only way that a 
person can be committed as an SVP is if he is either convicted, or 
found not guilty by reason of insanity, of a qualifying sex offense.  
Additionally, in these states, a person may be committed as an SVP if 
 
206 Id.; see also FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRELIMINARY ANNUAL 
UNIFORM CRIME REPORT, JANUARY–DECEMBER 2010, at tbl.3, available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/preliminary-annual-ucr-jan-
dec-2010/data-tables/table-3 (showing the number of forcible rapes in 2010); U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:  2011, at tbl.310, available 
at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2011/tables/11s0310.pdf (showing that 
the forcible rape rate, per 100,000 population, was 36.8 in 1980, 41.1 in 1990, 37.1 in 
1995, 32.0 in 2000, 33.1 in 2002, 32.3 in 2004, 31.8 in 2005, 31.0 in 2006, and 30.0 in 
2007). 
207 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 205. 
208 David Finkelhor & Lisa M. Jones, Explanations for the Decline in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 
JUV. JUST. BULL. (Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Dep’t of Jus-
tice, Washington, D.C.), Jan. 2004, at 1. 
209 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT 2009, at ii (2010). 
210 Id. 
211 DAVID FINKELHOR, LISA JONES & ANNE SHATTUCK, UNIV. OF N.H. CRIMES AGAINST 
CHILDREN RESEARCH CENTER, UPDATED TRENDS IN CHILD MALTREATMENT, 2008, at 1–2. 
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a judge finds that he committed a qualifying sex offense for which he 
was charged but was later deemed incompetent to stand trial.  The 
Adam Walsh Act affords none of these procedural protections.  The 
Act empowers the federal government to avoid the time and mone-
tary cost of trial as well as the risk of a defendant being found not 
guilty.  For a prosecutor intent on locking someone up forever as an 
SVP, it is far cheaper and easier to go through civil commitment pro-
ceedings than the criminal process.  The Supreme Court should not 
uphold rules that create incentives for undermining constitutional 
rights. 
VI. PUBLIC POLICY CONCERNS 
Even if the Supreme Court holds that the Adam Walsh Act does 
not violate procedural due process, states must still decide whether 
they should lower the threshold for commitment under the sexually 
violent predator laws.  After all, the Supreme Court merely sets the 
floor for constitutional protections; states may always guarantee 
more.  This Part argues that enhanced procedural protection makes 
sense from a public policy perspective. 
Implementing the sexually violent predator laws as currently writ-
ten demands enormous resources, and changing the laws to increase 
commitments would only end up costing the state more.  When there 
were just sixteen SVP states, funding was estimated to be somewhere 
in the range of $225 million to $321 million per year.212  As the num-
ber of commitments increases, so will the costs.  In the budget year 
2005–2006, California allocated $64 million to cover all SVP related 
costs.  This was a cost of $150,000 per committed SVP, and this did 
not include courtroom or attorney costs.213  This figure is pretty stan-
 
212 ERIC S. JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT:  AMERICA’S SEXUAL PREDATOR LAWS AND THE RISE OF 
THE PREVENTIVE STATE 62 (2006) (citing WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, 
INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT OF SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATORS:  COMPARING STATE LAWS 1 
(2005); TERRENCE W. CAMPBELL, ASSESSING SEX OFFENDERS:  PROBLEMS AND PITTFALLS 6 
(2004)). 
213 DEIDRE M. D’ORAZIO, STEVEN ARKOWITZ, JAY ADAMS & WESLEY MARAM, THE CALIFORNIA 
SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR STATUTE:  HISTORY, DESCRIPTION & AREAS FOR 
IMPROVEMENT (2009), available at http://ccoso.org/papers/CCOSO%20SVP%20Paper.
pdf.  For the first eight years after California’s SVP law was passed, SVPs were housed at 
Atascadero State Hospital.  Id. at 19.  In 2005, the state completed Coalinga State Hospit-
al, which was specifically built to house SVPs.  Id.  As of September 2011, Coalinga housed 
more than nine hundred sex offenders.  Ryan Gabrielson, Sex Offenders at State Hospital 
Protest “Violent Predator” Designation, CALIFORNIA WATCH (Sept. 21, 2011), 
http://californiawatch.org/dailyreport/sex-offenders-state-hospital-protest-violent-
predator-designation-12692. 
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dard.214  Legal fees add significantly more.  Not only are there attor-
ney fees, but there are also expert fees and the costs of trial and ap-
peal.  In Washington State, the legal fees per offender added up to 
$60,000 per year.215 
In order to pay these costs, some states have taken measures like 
reducing the number of probation officers and cutting funds to do-
mestic violence and sexual violence prevention programs.216  Others 
have cut funding to sex offender treatment programs that have been 
shown to reduce recidivism by as much as 30% to 40%.217  In addition, 
these laws force states to divert funds from addressing the lion’s share 
of sex crimes, which are perpetrated by family and friends. 
In a world of limited resources, states spend hundreds of millions 
of dollars locking up individuals for crimes that they might commit 
instead of spending money solving crimes that have already hap-
pened.  This irony is especially poignant with regards to the thou-
sands of rape kits that languish in police departments across the 
country.  According to a 2009 Human Rights Watch report, in Los 
Angeles alone at the time, there were at least 12,669 untested sexual 
assault kits (known as rape kits).218  In order to test these kits, Los An-
geles would need to hire additional staff in their DNA laboratory at a 
cost of approximately $1.6 million a year.219  Although the Los An-
geles Police Department has made some progress in reducing the 
number of unanalyzed kits, the California budget crisis has led to 
mandatory work furloughs that have slowed down these efforts.220  
 
214 See ROXANNE LIEB & SCOTT MATSON, WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POL’Y, SEXUAL 
PREDATOR COMMITMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES:  1998 UPDATE, at 11 (1998) (stating 
that some of the estimated combined annual housing and treatment costs per individual 
were $97,000 for Florida, $80,000 for Kansas, $110,000 for Minnesota, $85,000 for New 
Jersey, $100,000 for North Dakota, $70,000 for Washington, and $82,125 for Wisconsin). 
215 Id. 
216 See JANUS, supra note 212, at 115.  Janus writes that in 2004, California “spent more than 
$78 million to lock up 535 predators, while providing no substantial sex offender treat-
ment for the seventeen thousand sex offenders in its prisons.”  Id.  Janus also writes that 
in 2004 Minnesota spent $26 million to lock up 235 predators.  Id.  That same year, pecu-
niary problems forced the state to propose cutting 137 of its 778 police officers and to ac-
tually eliminate one hundred probation officers’ positions despite rising caseloads, and it 
cut its funding for domestic violence and sexual violence prevention programs by $3.6 
million per year.  Id. 
217 Id. at 115, 126 (describing lack of funding for sex offender treatment programs in Cali-
fornia and Massachusetts). 
218 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TESTING JUSTICE:  THE RAPE KIT BACKLOG IN LOS ANGELES CITY 
AND COUNTY 1 (2009). 
219 Id. at 32–33. 
220 Joel Rubin, LAPD Cuts Backlog of Untested DNA Cases in Half, L.A. NOW BLOG (Oct. 5, 2009, 
1:44 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2009/10/lapd-cuts-backlog-of-
untested-dna-cases-in-half-.html. 
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Consequently, thousands of rapists are walking the streets, potentially 
stalking new victims. 
CONCLUSION 
In twenty states across the country and in federal prisons, individ-
uals are being kept in custody past their scheduled release date be-
cause they have been adjudicated to be sexually violent predators.  
Deeming these laws civil instead of criminal significantly reduces the 
constitutionally required procedural protections.  Although accused 
sexually violent predators are facing lifetime incarceration, they do 
not have the right to competency, the right to a jury trial, the right 
against self-incrimination, or the right to have their status proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The Adam Walsh Act reduces these protections still further by al-
lowing a person to be committed indefinitely as a sexually violent 
predator who has never been convicted of, or even charged with, a 
sex offense.  Although the Supreme Court upheld the Adam Walsh 
Act in United States v. Comstock, it did so on limited grounds.  Indeed, 
the Court specifically noted that other grounds for challenging the 
law—such as whether it violates due process—have not been adjudi-
cated. 
In light of this, the Court can expect another challenge to the 
Adam Walsh Act in the not-so-distant future.  This Article has argued 
that the Adam Walsh Act violates procedural due process and should 
not be upheld.  Should the Court decide that it does not violate due 
process to commit people indefinitely with such a low threshold of 
proof, this Article has argued that states should not follow suit.  It 
simply does not make sense from a public policy perspective due to 
the likely error rate and the expense. 
If states want to protect men, women, and children from danger-
ous sex offenders, they should direct the money that might be spent 
incarcerating persons unlikely to reoffend in ways that have been 
proven successful at reducing sex crimes.  And, at least as important-
ly, states should make sure that there are sufficient funds to solve sex 
crimes that have already occurred.  We live in a world of limited re-
sources, and it is critical that we allocate them using reason and not 
fear. 
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TABLE 1 
COMPARISON OF SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR COMMITMENT VS. 
COMMITMENT OF THE CRIMINALLY INSANE AND THE MENTALLY ILL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Sexually Violent Predator Criminally Insane Mentally Ill 
Right to Jury 
Trial 
No Yes No 
Timing of 
Hearing 
After finding of guilt and after 
criminal sentence has been 
completed 
Varies by state.  Some states have a 
bifurcated trial in which jury must 
first come to a finding of guilt 
before they decide whether the 
defendant was insane at the 
commission of the crime. 
Unrelated to 
finding of guilt 
Right to 
Competency 
No Yes No
Right against 
Self-
Incrimination 
No Yes No 
Who Has 
Burden of 
Proof? 
Prosecutor Either side, but insanity is usually 
an affirmative defense thus giving 
defendant the burden of proof 
Prosecutor 
Standard of 
Proof 
Minimum standard is clear and 
convincing evidence.  
The state may require that the 
defendant prove his insanity 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Minimum 
standard is clear 
and convincing 
evidence 
Relevant 
Temporal 
Moment 
Defendant’s current mental state Defendant’s mental state at the 
time of the crime 
Defendant’s 
current mental 
state 
Is Mental State 
Only Issue? 
No.  District Attorney must prove 
that present mental disorder makes 
it difficult for defendant to control 
himself such that he poses the risk 
of committing a new sexually 
violent offense. 
Yes No.  State must 
prove that person 
is mentally ill and 
dangerous.   
Duration of 
Commitment 
Indefinite Indefinite Indefinite 
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TABLE 2 
SEXUAL VIOLENT PREDATOR STATUTES ACROSS THE COUNTRY BY DATE 
OF PASSAGE—TYPE OF COMMITMENT, NUMBER OF PEOPLE 
COMMITTED/RELEASED AND TOTAL BUDGET 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
StateYear of 
Passage 
Length/Type of Commitment # of People 
Committed as of 
Summer 2008 
# of People 
Ever 
Released 
Total Civil 
Commitment 
Budget 
(Millions) 
WA 1990 Indeterminate 
 
Placement in a secure facility 
operated by the department of social 
and health services for control, care 
and treatment 
213 Unknown $38.6 
KS 1994 Indeterminate 
 
Kept in a secure facility 
216 13 $10.9 
MN 1994 Indeterminate 
 
Secure treatment facility unless 
person proves by clear and 
convincing evidence that a less 
restrictive treatment facility is 
consistent with his treatment needs 
and safety of the public 
516 0 $54.9 
WI 1994 Indeterminate 
 
“Committed to the custody of the 
department for control, care and 
treatment until such time as the 
person is no longer a sexually violent 
person” 
352 36 $34.7 
AZ 1995 Indeterminate 
 
Licensed facility by state hospital 
58 114 $11.3 
CA 1995 Indeterminate 
 
Locked state run hospital 
808 24 $147.3 
IL 1997 Indeterminate 
 
Order of commitment to a secure 
facility or conditional release 
224 (206 in house, 18 
on conditional 
release) 
18 $25.8 
ND 1997 Indeterminate 
 
Least restrictive but appropriate 
treatment facility possible 
58 0 $5.4 
In Kansas v Hendricks 521 U.S. 346 (1997), the U.S. Supreme Court narrowly held that Kansas’s sexually 
violent predator law was constitutional.  
FL 1998 Indeterminate 
 
Secure state-run facility 
240 7 $23.3 
IA 1998 Indeterminate 
 
Confined to a state facility designed 
to confine, but not necessarily treat, 
SVP 
75 14 $5.0 
Dec. 2011] THROWING AWAY THE KEY 427 
 
TABLE 2 (CONT’D) 
SEXUAL VIOLENT PREDATOR STATUTES ACROSS THE COUNTRY BY DATE 
OF PASSAGE—TYPE OF COMMITMENT, NUMBER OF PEOPLE 
COMMITTED/RELEASED AND TOTAL BUDGET 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
StateYear of 
Passage 
Length/Type of Commitment # of People 
Committed as of 
Summer 2008 
# of People 
Ever 
Released 
Total Civil 
Commitment 
Budget 
(Millions) 
NJ 1998 Indefinite 
 
Facility designed for custody, care, 
and treatment 
340 24 $21.9 
SC 1998 Indeterminate 
 
Committed to custody of Department 
of Mental Health for control, care 
and treatment 
94 Unknown $2.9 
MA 1999 Indeterminate 
 
Committed to a treatment center 
105 4 $30.7 
MO 1999 Indeterminate 
 
Committed to the custody of the 
Director of the Department of 
Mental Health for control, care and 
treatment 
110 0 $9.8 
TX 1999 Outpatient 99 (50 in prison 
awaiting release and 
49 in half way houses 
or jail for violation of 
civil commitment) 
Outpatient $0.9 
VA 1999 Indeterminate  
 
Less restrictive alternatives to 
involuntary secure inpatient 
treatment are possible if they have 
been investigated and deemed 
suitable. 
138 Unknown $8.1 
In Kansas v Crane 534 U.S. 407 (2002), the U.S. Supreme Court clarified that in order to be committed as 
a sexually violent predator, there must be “proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior.” 
PA 2003 Lifetime registration with the police, 
verify their residence on a quarterly 
basis and attend monthly counseling 
sessions. 
20 0 $1.8 
NE 2006 Indeterminate 
  
“State must prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that...neither 
voluntary hospitalization nor other 
treatment alternatives less restrictive 
of the subject’s liberty than inpatient 
or outpatient treatment ordered by 
the Board are available or would 
suffice to prevent the harm.” 
10 0 $13.5 
428 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 14:2 
 
TABLE 3 
PROCEDURAL RIGHTS AT SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR COMMITMENT 
HEARINGS (ORGANIZED BY YEAR OF SVP LEGISLATION) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year State Right to 
Counsel 
Right to be 
Competent 
at Trial 
Right 
to 
Jury 
Trial
Standard of 
Proof 
Number on 
Jury Needed 
to Commit 
Fifth Amendment Right 
1990 WA Yes No Yes Reasonable 
doubt 
Unanimous Statute does not specify 
1994 KS Yes No Yes Reasonable 
doubt 
12 of 12 No.  Can be ordered to 
submit to psychiatric 
evaluation by state 
1994 MN Yes Statute does 
not specify 
No Clear and 
convincing 
N/A Not specified in statute 
1994 WI Yes No Yes Reasonable 
doubt 
12 out of 12 Yes 
1995 AZ Yes No Yes Reasonable
doubt 
6 of 8 Cannot assert privilege as 
reason to refuse to be 
deposed by the state 
1995 CA Yes No Yes Reasonable 
doubt  
12 of 12 No.  Can be called to the  
stand by the prosecution 
1997 IL Yes Statute does 
not specify 
Yes Reasonable 
doubt 
Unanimous Yes
1997 ND Yes Statute does 
not specify 
No Clear and 
convincing 
N/A Statute does not specify 
Kansas v 
Hendricks 
(1997) 
N/A Yes No  No  Clear and 
convincing 
N/A No 
1998 FL  Yes Yes Clear and 
convincing 
6 of 6 No
1998 IA  No Yes Reasonable 
doubt 
12, 
Unanimous 
Yes
1998 NJ  Statute does 
not specify 
No Clear and 
convincing  
N/A Can be ordered to submit 
to a psychiatric exam 
1998 SC  No Yes Reasonable 
doubt 
Unanimous Statute does not specify 
1999 MA  No Yes Reasonable 
doubt 
Unanimous If present evidence of 
own examiner cannot 
invoke privilege to 
preclude evaluation and 
testimony by state 
examiner 
1999 MO  No Yes Clear and 
convincing  
Unanimous No 
1999 TX  No Yes Reasonable 
doubt 
Unanimous Person may be ordered to 
submit to all expert 
exams.  If he does not, (1) 
his failure to participate 
may be used as evidence 
against him at trial; (2) he 
may be prohibited from 
offering his own expert 
testimony; and (3) he may 
be subject to contempt 
proceedings. 
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TABLE 3 (CONT’D) 
PROCEDURAL RIGHTS AT SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR COMMITMENT 
HEARINGS (ORGANIZED BY YEAR OF SVP LEGISLATION) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year State Right to 
Counsel 
Right to be 
Competent 
at Trial 
Right 
to 
Jury 
Trial
Standard 
of Proof 
Number on 
Jury Needed 
to Commit 
Fifth Amendment Right 
1999 VA  Statute does 
not specify 
Yes Clear and 
convincing  
7 of 7 Statute does not specify 
2003 PA  Statute does 
not specify 
No Clear and 
convincing  
N/A Def. can be ordered to 
undergo sexually violent 
predator assessment 
2006 NE  Statute does 
not specify 
No Clear and 
convincing 
N/A Statute does not specify 
2006 NH Yes Limited Yes Clear and 
convincing 
Unanimous “If the person refuses to 
submit to an examination by 
the state’s expert the court 
shall prohibit the person’s 
mental health experts from 
testifying concerning any 
mental health tests, 
evaluations, or examinations 
of the person.” 
2006 USA Yes Statute does 
not specify 
No Clear and 
convincing 
N/A Statute does not specify 
2007 NY Yes Statute does 
not specify 
Yes Clear and 
convincing 
Unanimous If respondent refuses 
psychiatric exam, jurors shall 
be instructed of such if 
requested. 
 
